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The present analysis sheds light on the setting up a regional rating agency in Asia in the 
wake of recent financial crisis. We investigate the policy facing a financial regulator while 
evaluating whether or not to admit new  entrants  into the credit rating market.  In an 
incomplete contracting framework, we show  that  an impartial financial regulatory body 
(represented by a benevolent supranational organization) can facilitate credit ratings of high 
quality by allowing for the entry of new rating agencies on a non-single basis than it does for 
a  mere  single entry. This finding is caused by  increased competition among the rating 
agencies, which induces higher quality of rating services even should rating agencies still 
exert below their maximum level of efforts. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Credit ratings and agencies  in the industry  have become an integral part of the global 
financial markets. Changes in ratings influence stock prices, bond prices, and the credit 
terms in general. Major global credit rating agencies (GRAs), including Fitch, Inc., Moody’s 
Investors Service (Moody’s) and Standard and Poor’s Ratings Services (S&P), have become 
household names and their rating reports often draw attention from politicians and business 
leaders alike. Despite GRAs being viewed as more credible than domestic rating agencies in 
most countries, the consequences of their rating actions in the global financial market have 
been put under close public scrutiny.  Several incidences in the credit ratings market have 
led to this development. First, the collapse of Enron Corporation (Enron) in the US has 
raised concerns about the potential "conflicts of interest’ (Golin 2001; Dittrich 2007). Second, 
the  AAA ratings were incredibly  assigned to complex derivative products with little high 
quality collateral. Third, major global rating agencies even assigned  investment-grade 
ratings to companies  just  prior to their  bankruptcy,  (SEC  2003). It is inevitable that 
reasonable doubt has been cast on the credibility of major rating agencies and their role in 
leading towards the recent global economic downturn has been highlighted, while discussion 
of the appropriate policy measures has now been extensively discussed (Bolton, Freixas, 
and Shapiro 2008)   
Indeed, a closer observation of recent developments in the global financial sector, with an 
emphasis on the failure to warn investors on the risk of complex financial products and on 
possible corporate collapses of major multinational firms,  naturally lead to the following 
questions: Does the credit rating industry deliver on its promises to enhance the mechanism 
aiming for sound and effective financial intermediation? How can the debate over ratings 
quality be reconciled when only three dominant credit rating providers located in the 
developed countries actually cater to the huge demand for rating services in the presence of 
divergent economic and financial characteristics amongst regions in the globe? How do the 
costs of efforts  involved in ratings  shape the industry structure of credit ratings in the 
presence of moral hazard? 
As a step towards the understanding to these questions, this paper studies the impacts on 
the quality of ratings when a financial regulator changes its admission policy towards the 
entry into ratings market of potential rating entrants. By admission of the potential rating 
entrants, we mean the entry of rating agencies that have country- and/or regional-specific 
knowledge about business practices in certain locales, in contrast to global agencies, which 
are instrumental in directing the developments of the industry. In the light of information 
asymmetry, we develop a simple incomplete contracting model of entry permit issuance with 
moral hazard. We envisage an environment in which a benevolent regulator (which can be a 
supranational organization or some accredited organization) oversees the admission into the 
credit ratings industry. In this framework, potential entrants would apply for an entry permit 
and negotiate over the entry fees with this organization, and the payment of entry fees would 
be collected for investment infrastructure improvement. We show non-single entry induces 
greater  competition between the rating agencies, which, in turn, leads to higher  ratings 
quality than it does otherwise even if both rating agencies still exert below their maximum 
level of efforts. 
Perhaps the theoretical paper most related to this paper is Millon and Thakor (1985), which 
considered credit rating agencies as a form of information gathering agencies (IGAs) and 
emphasized the important role of information asymmetries and moral hazard. However, this 
paper differs from theirs in two significant ways. First, unlike Millon and Thakor (1985), we 
investigate whether or not the organization’s capacity, represented by the amount of entry 
fees determined through negotiations in the presence of information asymmetry, is 
enhanced due to a change in the opening up of the market of potentially capable rating 
agencies. Using effort costs as an indication of the level of institutional barrier, we explore ADBI Working Paper 241    Tsai and Liu 
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the conditions under which a regional rating agency with country-specific expertise would 
survive  the competition against a global one in the presence of information asymmetry. 
Second, we consider an effort-inducing mechanism built upon an incomplete contract 
between the benevolent supranational organization (institutional principal  in the present 
context) and credit rating agency, in contrast to the noisy external monitoring in Millon and 
Thakor. This paper is also closely related to a recent contribution on strategic licensing in the 
presence of moral hazard (Schmitz 2007). In contrast to the assumption of zero profit due to 
Bertrand competition, we consider here a setting where the rating agencies equally share, 
depending upon their effort level, the total benefits generated from the ratings market, as 
their efforts demonstrated will determine whether they will be successful in securing rating 
business from potential clients.  We provide here an analytical framework that is general 
enough to approximate reality and yet simple enough to provide tractable insights.  
This paper, therefore, contributes to the discussion on whether or not a reshaping the credit 
rating industry by allowing for new entrants facilitates the enhancement in the quality of 
ratings amongst other important policy issues. Moreover, this paper also contributes to the 
literature in the area of institutional developments for financial sector reform and regional 
integration by exploring the implications for possible alignment of the financial landscape in 
Asia as it moves away from reliance upon major agencies outside the region. The paper also 
helps  to identify both policy challenges and opportunities that may emerge for further 
enhancement of regional integration in Asia through building  institutions  in instrumental 
financial services industry, such as the credit rating industries.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature related 
to the system governing the credit rating agencies in the globe. Section 3 contains an 
analytical model of strategic rating agency admission with moral hazard in the presence of 
incomplete information. Section 4 discusses the main findings, and Section 5 concludes.  
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is a large body of literature, both theoretical and empirical, on credit ratings and their 
roles in international financial markets. Previous research along this line can be divided into 
three branches: The first branch discussed the quality of ratings and addresses the question 
of whether or not the measurement in the quality of ratings meaningfully reflects what they 
are supposed to measure (Hickman 1958; Ang and Patel 1975; and Kao and Wu 1990). The 
second branch examined whether or not ratings reports qualitatively convey information that 
the market has not already incorporated into prices from other available information (Katz 
1974; Grier and Katz  1976; Ingram, Brooks,  and Copeland  1983; Weinstein  1977). For 
example, Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1992) found that ratings do contain information 
beyond what is publicly available. The third branch analyzed how the rating agencies use 
public information in setting the quality of ratings (Kaplan and Urwitz 1979; Ederington 1985; 
Lonski 1992; Grundy 1997; Pender 1992).   
Departing from these theoretical concerns, Blume, Lim,  and Mackinlay (1998:  1839–90) 
studied the credit ratings market and attributed the downward trend in the quality of ratings in 
the United States  due, in part, to changing standards. Ferri, Liu, and Stiglitz (1999) 
investigated  the informational value embedded in the sovereign rating of credit rating 
agencies. They found that sovereign credit ratings were pro-cyclical for the East Asian crisis-
hit economies during the 1997 financial crisis. Therefore, the authors argue that credit rating 
agencies appear to have aggravated the East Asian crisis by downgrading East Asian crisis 
countries more than the worsening in these countries’ economic fundamentals would have 
justified. 
Another strand of credit ratings literature, using the analytical framework of game theory, 
focused  on the role of information intermediaries. For example, studies by  Morgan and 
Stocken (2003) and Kartik (2008). Kartik, Ottaviani, and Squintani (2007) belong to this line ADBI Working Paper 241    Tsai and Liu 
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of research by using signaling games in which a sender faces a cost of lying. Inderst and 
Ottaviani (2008) examined  the impact on information revelation of strategic contracting 
between the sender and the receiver. They focus on a principal’s problem in providing 
incentives to a sales agent so as to simultaneously prospect for customers and advise 
customers on the product’s suitability. Similarly, Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2007) 
consider strategic contracting when the senders are setting prices for their products while 
providing suggestions to the uninformed investors.  
With regard to the literature on the implications of ratings shopping, Faure-Grimaud, 
Peyrache, and Quesada (2006) investigated corporate governance ratings in a market with 
truth-telling credit rating agencies and rational investors. They showed  that competition 
between rating agencies can lead to less information disclosure. Farhi, Lerner, and Tirole 
(2008) considered that information intermediaries (such as ratings agencies) can provide 
various types of verifiable information and investigate the impacts of market structure on the 
ratings shopping behavior by the rated entity (either firms or individuals). 
3.  THE BASIC MODEL 
The setup of the model consists of two risk-neutral parties, a regulator (represented by a 
benevolent  supranational organization) and a group of credit rating agencies. The 
supranational organization (principal) issues permit to the rating agency (agent) in 
accordance with the standards governing the provision of rating services.
1
The expected share of net benefit to each agency  i  is  given 
by
 Each rating 
agency i, where i = 1, 2, … , n, is potentially capable of providing rating services which 
allows  its  client (the issuer) to  acquire  capital (e.g. issue  bonds), provided these rating 
agencies obtain a permit from the supranational organization. An agency that obtains a 
permit decides its  effort level in providing ratings  report  of high quality, which in turn 
facilitates its market share in the ratings industry as long as the issuers successfully acquire 
funding from the capital markets. Denote by z  the outcome of whether or not an issuer 
acquires capital. If z = 1, the issuer does. If z = 0, it does not. k is the total number of rating 
agencies whose clients successfully acquire capital given the agent’s effort. R is the size of 
































 In this set up, an agency enjoys the monopoly benefit 
( ) if only one agency is successful in providing the services for securing the funding 
needs. Otherwise, the total benefit is equally split amongst the agencies, and each agency 
obtains an expected share s when there are k out of n agencies successfully assists the 
issuers in acquiring the capital. An alternative explanation of the current setting can be 
provided if we interpret agency i as a local rating agency, instead of one of the global rating 
agencies. Indeed, when agency i  adopts the guidelines set out by the supranational 
organization, the policy issue of encouraging the credit ratings industry becomes evident as 
the fees schedule now serves as one form of the policy instrument. 
We assume that a rating agency’s effort, which is a hidden action, determines whether or not 
the issuer can successfully secure rating business from its potential client, and that the 
                                                 
1 We consider as an equilibrium outcome the existence of a supranational organization, subsequent to the recent 
failure of major global rating agencies in predicting corporate collapses. Naturally, the issue of moral hazard in 
the analytical framework of agency theory captures an important aspect of possible consensus in reaching 
multilateral agreement within the context of regional cooperation for the emergence of new local rating agencies.  
2  Without the loss of generality, we have assumed that each rating agency provides its services only to a single 
client (the issuer). Nonetheless, this simple characterization can easily be extended to a more general situation of 
multiple clients.  ADBI Working Paper 241    Tsai and Liu 
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issuer can succeed with probability  H p  if the agent works hard,  and with probability 
) , 0 ( H L p p ∈  if the agent shirks.
3
All parties are assumed to be risk-neutral and wealth-constrained (see Innes [1990]). It is 
obvious that a rating agency can only pay the permit fee when it earns a positive benefit 
 Denote by c the agent’s disutility of exerting effort.  
R si  
with expected share s, i.e.,  R s t i ≤ .
4
The structure of the negotiations over permit fee is as follows. First, the supranational 
organization announces a schedule of permit fees, which the rating agencies can accept or 
reject. If an agency rejects the fee schedule, it obtains no permit and, thus, its net benefit is 
zero. An agent who has accepted the fee schedule and is granted a ratings permit then 
decides whether or not to exert effort. Finally, the agent’s profits are realized and payment to 
the supranational organization is made.  
 We assume that the permit fee is determined through 
the negotiations between the supranational organization and the rating agency. The 
supranational organization alone cannot heighten competition in the credit ratings market by 
prescribing prices for the ratings services (see Katz and Shapiro [1986]).  
In order to bring out the message in a simple manner, we shall consider, in the following 
analysis, an environment in which there are two credit rating agencies i and j, where  j i ≠ , 
and each faces an effort cost of  i c . We assume  c c c j i = = for simplicity. Two scenarios are 
considered. In scenario I, all elements of the model are assumed to be verifiable, i.e., there 
is symmetric information. In scenario II, the decision of an agent whether or not to exert 
effort is a hidden action, i.e., there is information asymmetry, which leads to moral hazard. 
The main purpose of our analysis is to provide insights into the following questions: Should 
this supranational organization admit one agent entry into the ratings market or should both 
agents obtain permits? In the latter case, both credit rating agencies might be successful in 
helping raise funds, so that competition at the credit ratings market would lead to smaller 
profits.  
3.1  Analysis of Single Permit  
Assume first that the principal organization (or principal) issues an exclusive permit to one 
rating agency. Let e represent whether ( 1 = e ) or not ( 0 = e ) the agent exerts effort.
5
) ; ( e s t
I
 In 
scenario I, the fees schedule   announced by the organization is conditional upon s 
and e. The agent’s budget constraint implies  sR e s t
I ≤ ) ; (  must hold. Clearly, for any effort 
level e, the agent is willing to participate if the expected revenue minus effort costs is non-
negative, i.e., 
0 ] ) , ( [ ≥ − − = Π ec e e s t sR E
I .                (1) 
An intuitive interpretation of Equation (1) linking the present analysis to practical policy 
concerns can be provided as follows. If we interpret c as the cost of entry reflecting the floor 
requirements set out by the regulator, and t  as a fee schedule capturing the scale of 
payment paid to the regulatory agency, then Equation (1) implies the benevolent 
supranational organization can induce the effort of credit rating agency through its design of 
                                                 
3 For simplicity, we assume that if both agents obtain permits, whether agent i is successful or not is independent 
of agent j, where i j ≠ . 
4 Note that fixed fees for employing the credit ratings services are considered regardless of the success of the 
issuer, since an issuer always has to incur some costs.    
5 The qualitative result holds even when we consider a continuous level of effort ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ i e
, where L H i , = . ADBI Working Paper 241    Tsai and Liu 
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fee schedule while taking into account the agency’s performance in facilitating access to 
capital for her client and her effort level.  
It is clear that the agent accepts a fee schedule of  R e t
I = ) , 1 (  and  0 ) ; 0 ( = e t
I  when  it 
implements low effort since 




L t R p t R p , i.e.  ) 0 , 1 (
I t R ≥ . 




H H , i.e.  H
I p c R t / ) 1 ; 1 ( − ≥ , and  




L − − ≥ − ⋅ ) 1 , 1 ( )] 0 , 1 ( 1 [ .   
It follows that (a) must bind and, thus,  R t
I = ) 0 ; 1 ( . 
And if the agent implements high efforts, the participation constraint implies 




H H ≥ ⋅ − − ⋅ − ) 1 , 0 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 , 1 ( , i.e.  ) 1 ; 1 ( /
I
H t p c R ≥ − ;  




L t R p t R p , i.e. ) 0 , 1 (
I t R ≤ ; and  




L − − ≤ − ⋅ ) 1 , 1 ( )] 0 , 1 ( 1 [ .  
It is easy to verify that (d) must bind, implying that  H
I p c R t / ) 1 ; 1 ( − = , which allows for (f) to 
sustain.  
In the presence of information asymmetry (scenario II), the fees schedule  ) (s t
II  is no longer 
conditional on e. The budget constraint suggests that sR s t
II ≤ ) ( . For any effort level e 
implied by the fees schedule, the agent’s participation constraint  0 )] ( [ ≥ − − = Π ec s t sR E
II  
must hold. It is evident that the agent offers  sR s t
II = ) (  if it implements low effort since 




L t R p t R p , i.e.  ) 1 (
II t R ≥ , 




H H , i.e.  H
II p c R t / ) 1 ( − ≥ , and  




L − − ≥ − ⋅ ) 1 ( )] 1 ( 1 [ . 
It follows that condition (g) must bind, and we have sR s t
II = ) ( . 
Furthermore, the agent’s incentive compatibility constraint, read as  
] 0 ) ( [ ] 1 ) ( [ = − ≥ − = − e s t sR E c e s t sR E
II II ,           `  (2) 
must hold, which together with budget constraint implies participation. Note that Equation (2) 
can be alternatively expressed as 








H t p t R p e t R p t R p − − − ⋅ ≥ − − ⋅ − + − ⋅ . 
It is straightforward to verify that an agent accepts a fee schedule of  0 ) 0 ( =
II t  and 
) /( ) 1 ( L H
II p p c R t − − = . 
3.2  Analysis of Non-single Permit 
Now, consider that the supranational organization issues permits to two agents 2 , 1 , = j i , 
and  j i ≠ . Let  } 1 ; 0 { ∈ i s  indicate whether or not the client (the issuer) of agent ADBI Working Paper 241    Tsai and Liu 
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isuccessfully acquires his funding needs and let  } 1 ; 0 { ∈ i e  indicate whether agent i exerts 
effort.  
In scenario I, denote by ) , ; , ( j i j i
I
i e e s s t , where i j ≠ , the fees schedule offered by the 
supranational organization. The budget constraint of an agent implies that 
R s e e s s t i j i j i
I



























, Equation (3) must hold and, for effort levels  1 e  and  2 e , 
the participation constraints now read as 






























− c e e e e e s s t R z z
k k







i .  
Clearly, if the agent chooses to implement low effort, then the fee schedule is such that 
R z z
k k
e e s s t
k
k k




















2 ) 1 (
1
1 1
) , ; , (  since 
(j) 
[ ]
[ ] [ ] { } c e e t R e t R P



















− ⋅ − +  

 
 − ⋅ ⋅
) , 0 ; 0 , 0 ( 0 ) 1 ( ) , 0 ; 1 , 0 ( 0 ) 1 (









[ ] [ ] { } c e e t R e t R P























) , 1 ; 0 , 0 ( 0 ) 1 ( ) , 1 ; 1 , 0 ( 0 ) 1 (





, and  
 
(l)  ) ( ) ( k j ≥ , that is,  
 
{ }
{ } c e e t R P









≥ − ⋅ −
+ ⋅ − − ⋅ − −
) , 0 ; 1 , 0 ( ) 1 (





is greater than  
 
{ }
{ } c e e t R P









≤ − ⋅ −
+ ⋅ − − ⋅ − −
) , 1 ; 1 , 0 ( ) 1 (




 ADBI Working Paper 241    Tsai and Liu 
 
7 
Clearly, Condition (j) must bind and, thus, we 
have R z z
k k

























2 ) 1 (
1
1 1
) , ; , ( , More specifically, 
2 / ) , 0 ; 1 , 1 ( R e t j
I
i = ; R e t j
I
i = ) , 0 ; 0 , 1 ( ;  0 ) , 0 ; 1 , 0 ( = j
I
i e t ; and  0 ) , 0 ; 0 , 0 ( = j
I
i e t . This result 
indicates that the agents equally share the total benefit in the ratings market should they 
both succeed.  
And if the agent  exerts honestly high effort, it  would only accept a  fee schedule 
of 0 ) , ; , 0 ( = j i j
I
i e e s t ,
) 1 (








R e t ,  R e t j
I
























In scenario II, denote the fees from agent i by ) ; ( j i
II




























2 ) 1 (
1
1 1
) , ( and the participation constraints are 






























− c e e e s s t R z z
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i .        (4) 
If agent i  implements low effort, then it  accepts a fees schedule 



























2 ) 1 (
1
1 1
) , ( . 
If the agent implements high effort, then the incentive compatibility constraints implies the 
fees schedule is such that  0 ) , 0 ( = j
II
i s t , 
) 1 )( (
















t  (see Appendix). 
Before presenting the main findings, we highlight the impact on effort cost of incomplete 
information  a la  Laffont and Martimort (2002). Lemma 1 below summarizes the results 
obtained in the previous analysis on the fee schedule. 
Lemma 1 
For any ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ H p ,  ] , 0 [ H L p p ∈  and  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ c , the cost of effort under complete information 








) ( hidden is effort if c
p p
p
verifiable is effort if c
c
L H
H ϕ  
The proof is trivial, and, hence, omitted.. 
Lemma 1 suggests that the cost of effort to agent i is adjusted upwards under incomplete 
information.   ADBI Working Paper 241    Tsai and Liu 
 
8 
3.3  Main Results 
We now summarize, in Proposition 1, the fee revenue to the principal under complete 
information and incomplete information.  
Proposition 1 
For any ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ H p ,  ] , 0 [ H L p p ∈ ,  0 > c  and  c c ≥ ) ( ϕ ,  








. 1 ), (
, 0 ,
) (
e if c R p












= = − −




. 1 , ) ( 2 ) 2 (
, 1 , 0 ), ( )] [





e e if c R p p
e e if c R p p p p
e e if R p p
e e
H H





An important message emerging from Proposition 1 suggests that the agent can enjoy rent 
when it implements high effort under incomplete information, while the principal can always 
extract the expected total surplus under complete information.   
Proposition 2 below characterizes the principal’s optimal strategies of issuing entry permits.  
Proposition 2 
For any ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ H p ,  ] , 0 [ H L p p ∈  and  ) 1 , 0 ( ) ( ∈ c ϕ ,   
(a). If 2 / 1 ≤ H p , then the supranational organization always issues permits to two agents. 
Both agents exert high effort if R p p p c H L H ) 1 )( ( ) ( − − < ϕ , both agents exert low effort 
if R p p p c L L H ) 1 )( ( ) ( − − > ϕ , while one agent exerts low effort and the other high effort 
otherwise. 
(b) If 2 / 1 ≥ L p , then only one agent obtains permit. High effort is exerted for 
any R p p c L H ) ( ) ( − ≤ ϕ , and low effort otherwise. 
(c) If  H L p p < < 2 / 1 , then the supranational organization issues permit only to one agent 
and it exerts high effort for any  R p p p c L L H )] 2 ( [ ) ( − − ≤ ϕ , and both agents obtain permits 
and exert low effort otherwise.  
Proof 
Using the results contained in Proposition 1, compare the principal’s payoffs under the 
scenario of non-single agents, it is evident the principal issues a permit to two agents and 
both exert high effort when R p p p c H L H ) 1 )( ( ) ( − − < ϕ , and both exert low effort 
when R p p p c L L H ) 1 )( ( ) ( − − > ϕ . Moreover, in the scenario of single agent, subtract the 
principal’s payoffs under low effort from that under high effort, it is clear that a single permit 
is issued to the agent which exerts high effort if  R p p p c L L H ) 1 )( ( ) ( − − > ϕ , and low effort 
otherwise. Finally, compare the principal’s payoffs under two scenarios, and subtract its 
payoffs under high effort with single agent and low effort with non-single agent, it follows that 
the permit is issued to only one agent and it exerts high effort if  R p p p c L L H )] 2 ( [ ) ( − − ≤ ϕ , 
and to two agents and both exert low effort otherwise. ADBI Working Paper 241    Tsai and Liu 
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Interestingly, when the effort costs are sufficiently large, it is in the interest of the principal to 
issue permits to two agents even though both exert low effort, while the principal issues 
permit to a single agent and it exerts high effort when the effort cost is sufficiently low. This 
result can be interpreted with reference to the standard cases of (a) and (b) in Proposition 2. 
Intuitively, in order to increase the probability that the issuer successfully acquires capital 
and thus, the information rent, it is always in the principal’s interest to issue permits to 
provide licenses to both agents even though high effort may still lead to a relatively small 
success probability (case (a)). In contrast, it is optimal to issue permit to one single agent 
even though low effort can lead to a relatively large success probability (case (b)). 
4.  DISCUSSION 
We now discuss the effect of moral hazard, the effect of changes in the effort costs on the 
principal’s strategy of permit issuance.    
4.1  The Effect of Moral Hazard 
A straightforward comparison of the payoffs to a benevolent supranational organization 
under two regimes of information structure illustrates the effect of moral hazard. It is 
instructive to note that for any  H L p p < < 2 / 1 , if 
R p p p c R p p p
p
p p
L L H L L H
H
L H )] 2 ( [ )] 2 ( [ − − < < − −
−
, then the principal issues  permits to 
two agents in the presence of moral hazard, while only a single agent obtains permit under 
symmetric information. Hence, there are situations in which more permits are issued due to 
moral hazard. And we have, thus, shown an interesting result in contrast to those obtained in 
the literature.    
4.2  Changes in Effort Cost 
Notice that, for any  H L p p < < 2 / 1 , the principal’s permit-issuing strategy depends upon the 
agent’s effort cost  ) , ( 2 1 c c c∈ ,  where  R p p p
p
p p
c L L H
H
L H )] 2 ( [ 1 − −
−
=  and 
R p p p c L L H )] 2 ( [ 2 − − = . Denote by  ) , ( 2 1 c c c c
b ∈ =  as a benchmark. It is instructive to 
note the result holds when an increase in effort cost to 
p c  from 
b c such 
that )) ( ), (( 2 4 1 3 c c c c c c
b p − − ∈ − , where ) , ( ) , ( 2 4 L H L H p p c p p c > , 
) , ( ) , ( 1 3 L H L H p p c p p c >  and  ) ( ) ( 1 3 2 4 c c c c − > − .  Hence, depending on the constellation 
of parameters  L p  and  H p , it need not always be in the principal’s interest to issue non-
single permits to two agents under moral hazard.  
5.  CONCLUSION 
In the present analysis, we have studied the problem of single versus non-single entry permit 
facing a benevolent supranational organization. We developed an analytical framework of 
incomplete contracting in which an agent negotiates with the principal on the fee schedule 
for obtaining a permit. We have demonstrated that there are conditions in which it is in the 
principal’s interest to issue permits to non-single agents even though they exert efforts below 
their maximum level. We have assumed that the fee schedule is a bargaining outcome 
between the principal and the agents under information asymmetry.   ADBI Working Paper 241    Tsai and Liu 
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The policy implications of the result obtained here can provide important insights into 
whether or not the admission into credit rating market of a new entrant agency can generate 
greater benefits  for investment infrastructure capacity building. The results may be 
particularly useful when considering, for example, the entry of a  regional credit rating 
agency. In fact, if we approximate the regional credit rating agency’s  expertise on local 
business practices as the indication of the extent to which the quality of its report facilitates 
the access to capital of the issuer, then the present analysis suggests that a supranational 
organization could always benefit from admitting into the industry of more than one single 
rating agency in the presence of moral hazard. This first result provides a justification for 
undertaking steps towards institutional realignment in incorporating into the industry of 
regional credit rating agency. Further, our findings can also contribute insights into the 
discussion on whether or not an investor payment regime is better than an issuer payment 
system  in overcoming the “conflict of interest”  as raised by the critics. Clearly, the fee 
schedule in the present analysis represents a performance-based outcome of negotiation 
between the supranational organization and the rating agency. In the presence of incomplete 
information, if we interpret the permit fee as an indication of the effort level that a 
supranational organization intends to induce, then the fee schedule reflects the extent to 
which the rating agency exerts effort in delivering a quality rating report. The second result 
offers an explanation for possible reformulation in the payment system for the rating 
services. Our analysis also sheds light on role of institutional/regulatory barriers in affecting 
the effort levels of the competing rating agencies. Using effort costs as a proxy for the costs 
of the regulatory barrier, we have shown the conditions under which a regional credit rating 
agency survives the competition against a global one. The third result underpins the 
theoretical support for the case of setting up regional credit rating institution in Asia. It is 
important to note that the present analysis provides the theoretical backbone for policy 
recommendation in promoting practical subject matters such as Asian Bond Market Initiative, 
in particular, when the notion of equilibrium is agreed upon the recent failure of global credit 
ratings agencies in predicting corporate collapses.   
Although the present model has not explicitly investigated the welfare implications, the 
treatment of supranational organization setting up guidelines in permit issuances, which 
allows for the admission of credit rating agencies in different regions suffices to serve as 
proxy for the implications of welfare in each distinct region. Nonetheless, the present 
analysis has not been able to provide policy recommendations on issues of ratings shopping 
and the precision of credit rating agencies’ evaluation models. We believe there are broad 
avenues for further research into these important policy issues for the development of credit 
rating industry.    
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Under scenario I, if agent i  implements  high  effort level  ( 1 = i e ),  given  her  rival’s effort 
level j e , her expected payoff is given by 
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In scenario II, denote the fees from agent i by ) ; ( j i
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If agent i  implements low effort, it is evident the fee schedule is given 
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must hold, which also ensure participation. Note that the incentive compatibility can be 
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which can be expressed as  
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